KAMPALA — Uganda’s continuing debate about governance, accountability and the management of public resources raises an important question: could a broader power-sharing model help strengthen checks and balances and reduce opportunities for corruption?
One model worth discussing is consociational democracy, a system in which major political, regional, ethnic or other organised groups participate in governing institutions rather than allowing political power to be concentrated largely in the hands of one dominant group.
The model is associated with political scientist Arend Lijphart and is built around principles such as broad coalition governments, proportional representation, minority protection and a degree of autonomy for different communities.
For Uganda, the idea would not necessarily mean simply creating positions for different ethnic or regional groups. Instead, it could be adapted around institutional power-sharing, stronger parliamentary oversight, independent institutions and wider participation in decision-making.
Uganda’s Constitution already contains principles that could support some elements of such an approach. It calls for active citizen participation, access to leadership, decentralisation and a government broadly representative of the country’s national character and social diversity. It also states that public offices are held in trust for the people and that measures should be taken to expose and combat corruption and abuse of power.
How could it help with corruption?
One possible advantage of a broader power-sharing arrangement would be the creation of stronger political checks on the use of public resources.
Where important government decisions involve several political interests, it may become more difficult for one political faction to exercise unchecked control over public institutions. Parliamentary committees, opposition representatives and other oversight bodies could have greater opportunities to question government spending and demand explanations.
This would not automatically eliminate corruption. Consociational democracy is a political structure, not an anti-corruption programme. If institutions remain weak or political leaders protect one another, power-sharing could simply distribute opportunities for patronage rather than solve the underlying problem.
For the system to contribute to accountability, power-sharing would therefore need to be accompanied by independent oversight institutions, transparent public procurement, effective audits, access to information, protection for whistleblowers and meaningful enforcement of anti-corruption laws.
Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index gives Uganda a score of 25 out of 100, placing it 148th among 182 countries and territories. Transparency International also identifies independent justice and oversight, transparent political finance and stronger civic space among measures that can help strengthen accountability.
A stronger role for Parliament
A Ugandan version of consociational democracy could place greater emphasis on Parliament as a genuine institution of oversight.
Members from different political parties and regions could work through parliamentary committees to scrutinise government expenditure, public contracts and major development programmes without oversight being viewed purely through the lens of government versus opposition.
The Constitution already gives Parliament responsibility for monitoring public expenditure, while accounting officers are required to account for public funds.
The challenge, therefore, may not simply be the absence of laws, but how effectively existing institutions exercise their constitutional responsibilities.
Decentralisation could also become important
Uganda already has a decentralised system of local government. The Constitution provides for the transfer of functions and powers to local governments and emphasises people’s participation and democratic control in decision-making.
A stronger power-sharing approach could build on this principle by giving communities greater opportunities to monitor projects and public expenditure in their own areas.
Citizens who can easily access information about a road project, health centre, school or other government programme may be better placed to question whether the money allocated was actually used for its intended purpose.
But there are risks
Consociational democracy should not be presented as a guaranteed solution to Uganda’s corruption problem.
If political representation becomes based too heavily on ethnic or regional identity, it could unintentionally institutionalise divisions rather than overcome them. There is also a danger that political leaders could use power-sharing arrangements to negotiate positions and resources among elites without improving ordinary citizens’ access to services.
For Uganda, therefore, the central question should not simply be who gets which government position, but how power can be divided sufficiently to prevent abuse while ensuring that public institutions remain accountable to citizens.
The debate Uganda could have
A discussion about consociational democracy could offer Uganda an opportunity to rethink how political power, parliamentary oversight and public accountability work together.
The country already has constitutional commitments to democratic participation, decentralisation, representation, accountability and combating corruption.
What could be explored is whether those principles can be strengthened through institutions in which government, opposition, regions, local governments, civil society and citizens have meaningful roles in scrutinising the exercise of public power.
Ultimately, the value of consociational democracy for Uganda would depend less on the name of the system and more on whether it produces real checks and balances, transparent decision-making and consequences for misuse of public resources.
In a country where corruption remains a significant governance concern, the debate may therefore be worth having—not as a replacement for Uganda’s existing constitutional framework, but as a discussion about how political power can be organised to make accountability harder to evade and public institutions harder to capture.
